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CAN OBJECTIVISTS ACCOUNT 
FOR SUBJECTIVE REASONS?
Daniel Wodak
he distinction between objective and subjective reasons is quite in-
tuitive, in part because the two seem to play different roles in normative 
thought. If a blue pill would cure Anna’s disease, there is an objective rea-
son for her to take it. If Anna believes that only the red pill would cure her, there 
is a subjective reason for her to take it. And if Anna received misleading evidence 
that taking the red pill causes nausea, there would be a less weighty subjective 
reason not to take it. The objective reasons bear on what Anna objectively ought 
to do (take the blue pill). The subjective reasons bear on what she subjective-
ly ought to do (take the red pill). Objective and subjective reasons also seem 
to play distinct roles from the second-person standpoint: the objective reasons 
bear on what a fully informed interlocutor should advise Anna to do, but do not 
bear on what that interlocutor should criticize her for doing, and vice versa for 
subjective reasons, which bear on whether a fully informed interlocutor should 
criticize Anna, but not on what that interlocutor should advise her to do.
If there are objective and subjective reasons, how are they related? Are they 
species of a genus? If so, what is the differentia? Does one reduce to the other? 
If so, how does the reduction go? Perhaps the most popular view on this issue 
is objectivism, which holds that subjective reasons reduce to objective reasons. 
My main aim in this paper is to offer two objections to objectivist accounts 
of subjective reasons. They concern probability and possibility. A secondary aim 
is to offer a diagnosis of why objectivists face these two objections. 
A quick methodological point will be helpful before we begin. I appeal to 
intuitions about existential claims about subjective and objective reasons. These 
can be challenged. One way to resolve such challenges—which I apply exten-
sively below—is to consider the distinct roles that objective and subjective rea-
sons play in normative thought. If one contends that p is a subjective (objective) 
reason to φ, it should play the same kind of roles as other plausible candidates 
for subjective (objective) reasons to φ. For instance, a putative objective reason 
for Anna to take the blue pill should play the same kind of roles as the fact that 
T
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the blue pill will cure her: it should bear on whether she objectively ought to 
take the pill, and whether a fully informed interlocutor should advise her to do 
so.1 I consider this to be a simple litmus test. It might admit of exceptions. But 
none of the cases I consider below is an exception to the rule. If one wishes to 
contend otherwise, the onus is on them to defend this.
1. Objectivism
Let us start by homing in on objectivism. Various objectivist accounts of subjec-
tive reasons have been developed and defended by Mark Schroeder, Jonathan 
Way, Derek Parfit, Eric Vogelstein, Daniel Whiting, Kurt Sylvan, and others. The 
central objectivist commitment is that we should analyze subjective reasons in 
terms of objective reasons. Most objectivists commit to a fairly narrow version 
of this view wherein we analyze all subjective reasons to φ directly—that is, in 
terms of objective reasons to φ.2 This will be part of my diagnosis of why extant 
forms of objectivism face the problems below. But let us not jump ahead. 
It is easier to understand objectivism by focusing on a particular account. 
Many prominent objectivists have been attracted to counterfactual analyses:
For R to be a subjective reason for X to do A is for X to believe R, and for it 
to be the case that R is the kind of thing, if true, to be an objective reason 
for X to do A.3
1 That objective and subjective reasons bear distinct relations to objective and subjective 
“oughts” is widely accepted: “some reasons will be facts of the sort that explain what one 
objectively ought to do, while other reasons will be facts of the sort that explain what one sub-
jectively ought to do” (Wedgwood, “The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons,’” 128). The former are objective 
reasons, the latter subjective reasons. Mark Schroeder appeals to something like this second 
role as a distinguishing feature of objective reasons throughout “Having Reasons.” He for-
mulates it as a counterfactual test: the question is whether “a fully informed and beneficent 
bystander would take [the putative objective reason] into account in advising” the agent to 
perform the relevant act (59). I prefer my formulation, but nothing hangs on this.
2 This constraint is evident in the quotation from Schroeder below; I believe it is also accept-
ed by Way and Parfit, along with other objectivists. For instance, here is Vogelstein’s view: “A 
subjective reason for one to φ is a proposition p such that the members of some consistent 
subset of one’s α jointly entail (1) that p is true, and (2) that the fact that p is an objective 
reason for one to φ” (Vogelstein, “Subjective Reasons,” 250).
3 Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 14. See also Schroeder, “Means-End Coherence, Stringency, 
and Subjective Reasons,” 233, for his similar “subjective reason test”: “X has a subjective 
reason to do A just in case she has some beliefs which have the property, if they are true, of 
making it the case that X has an objective reason to do A”; see also his converse test at 245.
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Subjective reasons [are] believed propositions that would be reasons if true.4
If we have certain beliefs about the relevant, reason-giving facts, and what 
we believe would, if it were true, give us some reason, . . . such beliefs give 
us an apparent reason.5
In what follows I focus primarily on the following version of this view:
C: p is a subjective reason for A to φ iff and because (a) A believes p, and 
(b) if p were true, p would be an objective reason for A to φ. 
To illustrate: that the red pill would cure her is a subjective reason for Anna to 
take the red pill iff and because she believes this proposition, and if it were true 
that fact would be an objective reason to take the red pill. 
Of course, C is not the only game in town. So we will also consider ways that 
C can be revised, as well as Whiting’s and Sylvan’s alternatives to C.
2. Probability
Now let’s consider how C handles cases involving (subjective) probability. To 
begin, consider Baqir. He knows that the blue pill would cure his disease. There 
are two other pills: red and green. Baqir knows that one of them will cure his 
disease and improve his eyesight, and the other will kill him. In fact, the red pill 
would kill Baqir and the green pill would cure and improve him. But Baqir does 
not know this. He justifiably assigns a .5 credence to each possibility. 
Counterfactual analyses like C seem to deliver the right results about cases 
like Baqir’s. Baqir believes that the blue pill will cure him. If that proposition 
were true (which it is) it would be an objective reason to take the blue pill. 
There the discussion of probability typically ends. This is unfortunate, as it 
only captures one class of cases: when there is subjective reason for agents to be 
cautious instead of risky. What about when there is subjective reason for agents 
to be risky rather than cautious? Can C get these cases right? 
Consider Carla. She knows that if she does not take the purple pill, she will 
die painlessly. But she does not know what the purple pill will do. She justifiably 
assigns a .5 credence to two possibilities: it will cure her completely, or it will kill 
her painfully. In fact, it will kill her painfully. Here are two data points: 
Datum1: There is a subjective reason for Carla to take the pill.
Datum2: There is no objective reason for Carla to take the pill. 
4 Way, “Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality,” 3.
5 Parfit, On What Matters, 1:111.
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These existential claims are quite intuitive, though they can be challenged. 
For now, let us take them as given and see whether they can be accommo-
dated by C. What is the subjective reason for Carla to take the pill? The most 
plausible answer, I believe, is a claim about subjective chance that we can call:
Probability: There is a .5 chance that the purple pill will cure Carla.
Is this response available to those who accept C? One immediate issue is wheth-
er Probability is truth-apt. Many take our discourse about subjective chance to 
be non-factive; they take subjective probabilities to be nothing more than ex-
pressions of creedal states. This is a problem for C, which holds that Probability is 
a subjective reason for Carla to take the pill only if Carla believes it, and if it were 
true, it would be an objective reason for her to take the pill.6
Let us put this issue aside. Grant that Probability can be true. If that is the case, 
presumably it is true. This generates a far more interesting problem for C. If C is 
true, Probability is a subjective reason to take the pill only if it is a counterfactual 
objective reason to take the pill. But if Probability is true, it is a counterfactual 
objective reason to take the pill only if it is an objective reason to take the pill in 
the actual world. And Probability is not an objective reason to take the pill in our 
world. To hold otherwise is to deny Datum2. 
In case the middle step in this reasoning is unclear, the basic idea is that coun-
terfactuals tell us what would be the case if the antecedent were true. So the 
consequent is true if the antecedent is true. And the antecedent of the relevant 
counterfactual, Probability, is true (supposing, again, that it is truth-apt). So if 
the counterfactual is true, the consequent must be true, too. But the consequent 
is the claim that Probability is an objective reason to take the pill. 
A brief aside. It is worth noting something about the broader dialectical im-
port of the specific point above. Arguably, one objectivist alternative to C is the 
Factoring Account, which was raised and rejected by Schroeder, and has since 
been defended at length by Errol Lord.7 The crucial commitment of the Fac-
6 See the discussion of vacuity in section 3, below, for more on why this would pose an issue.
7 See especially Schroeder’s “Having Reasons,” 58, in which he argues that “the Factoring 
Account is wrong. In the relevant sense, reasons you have are not things which are, inde-
pendently of you, reasons, and which moreover, you have. There are simply two reason re-
lations at stake.” Since the Factoring Account does not take there to be a second reason re-
lation, it is unclear whether it counts as a form of objectivism. I say that Lord has defended 
the factoring account, but there is a way of reading his view where it does not aim to analyze 
the notion of subjective reasons, and so is not objectivist in the sense I am concerned with. 
This is suggested in, e.g., Lord, “Having Reasons and the Factoring Account,” 290, and “The 
Coherent and the Rational,” 156. In personal communication, however, Lord clarified that 
he intends to analyze subjective reasons in terms of objective reasons that we have or pos-
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toring Account is that subjective reasons for A to φ are analyzable in terms of 
objective reasons for A to φ and possession: p is a subjective reason for A to φ iff 
p is an objective reason for A to φ and A has p. What led Schroeder to reject the 
Factoring Account, and defend C instead, is that the former insists that if p is a 
subjective reason for A to φ, then p is an objective reason for A to φ. But C inher-
its a similar commitment: if p is a subjective reason for A to φ and p is true, then 
p is an objective reason for A to φ. Objectivists had good grounds for wanting an 
account that allowed objective and subjective reasons to come apart, but C does 
not actually deliver that with true propositions.8
Now back to our main thread. How should a proponent of C respond to 
the objection above? I assume she will want to explain Datum1. But she might 
challenge Datum2. Schroeder argued that “negative existential intuitions about 
reasons are not to be trusted.”9 Some might take this to mean that they should 
never be trusted. But that would be a mistake. Schroeder’s explanation for why 
they should not be trusted turns on pragmatic implicatures about reasons with 
low weights. He offered a simple test for whether this applies to a given claim:
If I tell you that there is a reason for you to do something that there are 
only poor reasons for you to do, what I say will sound wrong. But—first 
prediction—it will sound less wrong if I tell you what the reason is, be-
cause doing so will remove the pragmatic reinforcement of the standing 
presumption that I have only relatively good reasons in mind. And sec-
ond, if I then tell you that I don’t think it is a particularly weighty reason, 
I should be able to cancel the presumption, and so the unintuitiveness of 
what I say should go down a second time.
Let us apply this to the case at hand. That there is an objective reason for Carla to 
take the pill sounds wrong. (This is why Datum2 seems true.) Does it sound less 
wrong if we identify the putative objective reason? The claim now is: that the 
purple pill has a .5 (subjective) probability of curing her is an objective reason to 
take the pill. This still seems wrong to me. The explanation for why, to be clear, is 
not because subjective chance is not part of the extra-mental world. Facts about 
sess, and resists the terminology “subjective” only because it is associated with the notion 
of “reasons [that] are just a function of one’s perspective, even when it is seriously deluded” 
(Lord, “What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same 
Thing!),” 14n25).
8 Schroeder argued that there is “the objective reason relation and the subjective reason rela-
tion, and the data give us no good reason to suspect that either is a restriction on the other, 
as the Factoring Account proposes” (“Having Reasons,” 58). I will not discuss the Factoring 
Account further, but the objections below target it too.
9 Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 92.
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subjective mental states can be objective reasons for actions and attitudes. That 
a man has pathological desires is an objective reason for him to seek therapy, and 
for us to not vote him into the White House. So my claim is not that Probability 
cannot be an objective reason per se. 
Rather, the claim I am making is that Probability is not an objective reason 
for Anna to take the pill. If that were the case, Probability should play similar roles 
to other plausible candidates for objective reasons for and against taking the 
pill. Objective and subjective normative notions play distinct roles in normative 
thought. Take Anna’s case once more. That the blue pill will cure her is an objec-
tive reason for her to take the pill. It bears on whether she objectively ought to 
take it, and whether, knowing the facts, we should advise her to take it. Subjec-
tive reasons play different roles: since Anna believes that the red pill will cure her, 
we should not criticize Anna for taking the red pill. So which roles does Proba-
bility play? It does not have any bearing on whether she objectively ought to take 
the pill. Nor does it have any bearing on whether, knowing the facts, we should 
advise her to take the pill. These roles are played by the facts about what the pills 
do. But Probability does play some roles: it bears on whether we should criticize 
Carla if she takes the pill, for instance. So Probability is a plausible candidate for 
a subjective reason to take the pill, but not a plausible candidate for an objective 
reason for her to take the pill. 
At this point, some might apply the second part of Schroeder’s test. Maybe 
the problem is just that saying that Probability is an objective reason for Carla to 
take the pill implicates that it is a weighty objective reason for her to take the pill. 
So let us cancel that implicature: Probability is a very weak objective reason for 
Carla to take the pill. Surely this sounds better! So is Datum2 false?
I do not think so. If the above reasoning is right, Probability is not merely 
an outweighed objective reason. The point of distinguishing between objective 
and subjective reasons is that they play distinct roles. If the fact that the pill will 
kill her competes with Probability in determining what Carla objectively ought 
to do, and how all-knowing advisors ought to advise her to act, the distinction 
between objective and subjective reasons is a distinction without a difference.
This raises the question of why the claim above sounds better once the impli-
cature is canceled. But that is fairly easy to explain. Mistakes can be more or less 
egregious. Saying that the fact that someone is your mother is a reason to torture 
her sounds very, very wrong. It sounds less wrong if you cancel the implicature 
that this is a weighty reason to torture her. But surely that does not mean that the 
implicature was the sole source of the problem!
So far we have seen that a proponent of C cannot accommodate the data 
by identifying Probability as the subjective reason for Carla to take the pill, and 
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should not respond to this problem by denying the data. An alternative response 
is to accommodate the data by finding some other candidate for the subjective 
reason for Carla to take the pill. Notably, many other initially plausible candi-
dates will raise the exact same problems as Probability. For instance, consider the 
following plausible conjecture: there is some evidence that justifies Carla’s beliefs 
and credences; whatever that evidence is, it is the subjective reason for her to 
act.10 To fill this proposal out a little, let us imagine that the relevant evidence is 
testimony—Carla is justified in assigning her credences on the basis of what her 
reliable friend said. Now we can consider the following proposition:
Evidence: The reliable friend said that there is a .5 chance that the purple 
pill will cure Carla.
Alternatively, consider the plausible conjecture that Carla’s doxastic states are the 
subjective reasons for her to act.11 Now we can consider the proposition:
Belief: Carla believes that there is a .5 chance that the purple pill will cure 
her.
Can a proponent of C say that Evidence or Belief is the subjective reason for Car-
la to take the pill? No: both initially plausible conjectures raise the exact same 
problems as Probability. Let us start with Evidence. If C is true, Evidence is a sub-
jective reason to take the pill only if it is a counterfactual objective reason to take 
the pill. And since Evidence is true, that means it is a counterfactual objective 
reason to take the pill only if it is an objective reason to take the pill in the actual 
world. But according to Datum2, there is no objective reason to take the pill (in 
the actual world). As with Probability, one can try to challenge this datum by 
appealing to Schroeder’s test, but we do not get better results when we apply 
this test to Evidence. It does not play the right roles to be an objective reason for 
her to take the pill. It has no bearing on whether she objectively ought to take 
the pill, or on whether, knowing the facts, we should advise her to take the pill.12 
The same reasoning applies to Belief with even greater force: it is also true, and 
clearly fails to play the right roles to be an objective reason for her to take the pill. 
If merely believing that pills will cure you is an objective reason for you to take 
them, the distinction between objective and subjective reasons seems to be a 
distinction without a difference. 
This shows that, to accommodate the data, the objectivist needs to find a very 
10 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this response.
11 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this response. It has affinities with Dale 
Dorsey’s view in “Objective Morality, Subjective Morality, and the Explanatory Question.”
12 If one doubts this, see the discussion of a similar proposal, Testimony, in section 3, below.
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different candidate for the subjective reason for Carla to take the pill. It should 
be a proposition such that Carla believes it and if it were true it would be an ob-
jective reason to take the pill; but it should not be a proposition that is actually 
true, lest we go through another round of the reasoning above. The best remain-
ing candidates, I believe, will be propositions like the following:
Prejacent: The purple pill will cure Carla.13
Why will the best remaining candidates be propositions like Prejacent? Because 
it is clearly truth-apt, it is false (so it does not face the same problems as Prob-
ability, Evidence, and Belief), and if it were true it would be an objective reason 
to take the pill. The obvious bug is that Carla does not believe Prejacent, and C 
insists that p is a subjective reason for Carla only if Carla believes that p. This 
necessary condition is explicitly embraced by Schroeder, Way, and Parfit in the 
passages quoted above.14 Plausibly, any alternatives to Prejacent that share its vir-
tues will also share this vice; there does not seem to be any false proposition that 
Carla actually believes such that if it were true it would be an objective reason for 
her to take the pill.
As has been previously noted, other views about reasons have a similar bug 
in cases like Carla’s, insofar as those views also require reasons to be believed 
(or known, or what have you).15 I am not sure whether the bug poses a serious 
problem for these other views, which are not framed as objectivist accounts of 
subjective reasons. It may be open to those views to identify propositions like 
13  In case this is unclear, I am calling this Prejacent to make a more general point. We have seen 
the difficulties objectivists face if they treat propositions like ◇p as a subjective reason to 
φ, where ◇ is an epistemic modal that scopes over what is called the prejacent: p. The most 
plausible move remaining is to treat the prejacent itself, p, as the subjective reason to φ.
14 To be clear, the issue here is not that these passages were clumsily formulated. Lord notes 
that on Schroeder’s view “a necessary condition for something to be a subjective reason is 
that one must believe the proposition that constitutes the subjective reason” (Lord, “Hav-
ing Reasons and the Factoring Account,” 291). See also Schroeder, “Means-End Coherence, 
Stringency, and Subjective Reasons,” 245, for a clear, specific case in which this necessary 
condition does serious work for Schroeder (“since Wynn does not have a belief about that, 
it does not figure among her subjective reasons”). In other work, Schroeder adopts a weaker 
necessary condition: a presentational attitude that p is all that is required (“What Does It 
Take to ‘Have’ a Reason?”). I believe this revised position is still vulnerable to the objection 
pressed here, for the same reasons discussed by Wedgwood in “The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons,’” 135. 
15 See, in particular, Wedgwood, who objects that common views about the relation between 
normative and motivating reasons systematically overestimate "the centrality of outright be-
lief ” (“The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons,’” 134); and see Schiffer, who objects that the widely held 
view that “one should act only on what one knows” is problematic in cases where an agent 
is “justified in acting on a partial belief ” (“Interest-Relative Invariantism,” 189–90).
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Probability as agents’ believed (or known, or . . .) reason for action.16 But this 
response is not available to views about subjective reasons such as C. 
It seems, then, that we must weaken the doxastic component of C. What if 
we allow that p is a subjective reason for Carla only if Carla has a credence above 
n in p, where n is specified at some value? What value would that be? It is easy to 
show that the relevant value for n will have to be very low. There can be a subjec-
tive reason to act even when one only has a negligible credence in the relevant 
proposition. Just make Carla almost certain that the purple pill is a placebo: say 
she justifiably assigns a credence of .99 (or .999, or . . .) to this proposition, and 
assigns a .005 (or .0005, or . . .) credence each to the propositions that it will 
cure her and that it will kill her painfully. Now the revised version of C will not 
explain why there is a subjective reason for her to take the purple pill unless we 
allow that any positive credence will suffice. 
The objectivist who most clearly embraces such a view is Vogelstein.17 It al-
lows objectivists to take Prejacent to be a subjective reason for Carla to take the 
pill, and does not imply that Prejacent is an objective reason for her to take the 
pill (because Prejacent is false), so it accommodates our data points. 
But this move comes with three serious costs. Vogelstein recognizes the first: 
it makes subjective reasons maximally proliferate. The consequences of acts are 
contingent. We should have credences between 0 and 1 in contingent truths. So 
for almost any idiotic action, agents should have some positive credence that it 
will cure Carla, or bring about world peace, or what have you. So as Vogelstein 
says, “we have subjective reasons to do almost anything.”18 This does not worry 
Vogelstein, who insists that such subjective reasons have very low weights, and 
wields Schroeder’s claims about intuitions about negative existential claims. I do 
not think that Vogelstein’s position here seems plausible if we apply the method-
ological point with which we started. But I do not want to pursue this point as I 
believe that this form of objectivism faces more damning problems. 
The second serious cost is that this form of objectivism misidentifies the rel-
16 For instance, that is how Hawthorne and Stanley respond to Schiffer in “Knowledge and 
Action,” 136, arguing that contra Schiffer (and, in effect, Wedgwood in “The Pitfalls of ‘Rea-
sons,’” 136), agents can believe or know Probability without having an implausible degree 
of conceptual sophistication. Neither Schiffer nor Wedgwood considers the objection that 
Probability is not an objective reason for action.
17 Dorsey endorses a similar view of subjective reasons in “Objective Morality, Subjective Mo-
rality, and the Explanatory Question.” Dorsey argues that “disbelieved propositions might 
themselves constitute subjective reasons” (11), and recognizes that his account proliferates 
subjective reasons (12). Many of my objections to Vogelstein’s view apply equally to Dors-
ey’s more complicated position.
18 Vogelstein, “Subjective Reasons,” 247–48. See note 2, above.
268 Wodak
evant subjective reasons. Even if the analysis gets the result that there is a subjec-
tive reason in these cases (Datum1), it gets the wrong result about which prop-
osition is a subjective reason for Carla to take the pill. The subjective reason is 
that there is a .5 probability that the pill will cure her, not that the pill will cure 
her. It is Probability, not Prejacent. After all, when we compare Anna and Carla, it 
is intuitive that they have quite different subjective reasons to act because Anna 
believes that the pill will cure her while Carla only believes that the pill might 
cure her. This shows up clearly when we consider what proposition would play 
the relevant role in normative thought: in explaining why they should not be 
criticized if they take the pill, we would appeal to something like Prejacent in 
Anna’s case and something like Probability in Carla’s case.19
The final serious cost is that C now commits us to an atomic rather than a 
holistic view. To bring this into focus, consider one final variant on Carla’s case. 
Say she was justifiably almost certain that the pill would kill her painfully, but 
still had some positive credence that it would cure her. Is there still a subjective 
reason for her to take the pill? On atomic views, there is: all that matters is her 
credence in the atomic proposition. On holist views, there is not: what matters is 
the overall distribution of probabilities over possible outcomes, not the assign-
ment of a probability to a single possible outcome. In other words, holism holds 
that propositions like “the purple pill might cure Carla” can be a reason to take 
the pill in one context (in which the subjective chance that the pill will kill her 
painfully is low) but not be a subjective reason to perform the same action in an-
other context (in which the subjective chance that the pill will kill her painfully 
is high); the atomist denies that this is possible.20 I am not sure whether atom-
ism or holism is true. But it strikes me that we should have an account of what 
it is to be a subjective reason that allows for both views to be coherently stated. 
Counterfactual analyses like Vogelstein’s do not have this feature. Chaos ensues 
once we plug distributions of probabilities over (logically inconsistent) possible 
outcomes into the antecedents of counterfactuals.21
So far I have argued that C faces serious problems with probability. This 
point is at least somewhat important on its own. But it becomes all the more 
important once we note that objectivists who eschew counterfactual analyses 
face the same problem—or, at least, a problem with the same structure. 
19 By “something like Probability,” I mean to include Evidence or Belief, since these proposi-
tions can plausibly also play the same roles as subjective reasons for Carla to take the pill.
20 I use the term holism because this view dovetails nicely with Jonathan Dancy’s version of 
value holism, according to which, “For any x that has value in one context, x may have a 
different value or none at all in other contexts” (“The Particularist’s Progress,” 13).
21 For this reason, Vogelstein’s view appeals to a consistent subset of one’s credences.
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Consider Sylvan’s view, according to which p is a subjective reason for A to φ 
iff and because p is an “apparent fact” that A is competently attracted to treating 
like an objective reason to φ.22 I am attracted to this view. But how does it apply 
to Carla’s case? What is the subjective reason for her to act? 
Sylvan might say: the answer is Probability. We supposed that Probability is 
truth-apt. In a similar vein, let us suppose that it is an “apparent fact.” For Sylvan, 
Probability is a subjective reason to take the pill only if Carla is competently at-
tracted to treating it like an objective reason to take the pill. We saw above that, 
for C, Probability is a subjective reason to take the pill only if it is an objective 
reason to take the pill, which is problematic because it does not play the right 
kind of roles to plausibly be an objective reason to take the pill. On that same 
basis, we can say that Carla is not competently attracted to treat Probability like 
an objective reason to take the pill. (The same holds for propositions like Prob-
ability, such as Evidence and Belief.) So for Sylvan, as for C, Probability cannot be 
Carla’s subjective reason to take the pill. 
What about Prejacent? This would be an objective reason if it were true. But 
Sylvan’s view faces the same problem as C here: Carla can have a subjective rea-
son to take the pill even when her credence in Prejacent is .5, or 0.00005, or what 
have you. (Keep in mind the variations on the case above.) It is hard to see how 
Prejacent can be an “apparent fact” to Carla when she believes that it is almost 
certainly false. So for Sylvan, Prejacent is not a subjective reason. 
In sum, counterfactual analyses and other forms of objectivism struggle to 
explain the data about subjective reasons in cases involving probability. Why has 
the problem been neglected? The whole point of introducing a distinction be-
tween objective and subjective reasons is that the facts can come apart from our 
perspective on the facts—subjective reasons, in Whiting’s wonderful phrase, are 
introduced to “keep things in perspective.” However, objectivists have only fo-
cused on how false beliefs cause the two to come apart. They have ignored how 
our perspectives systematically come apart from the facts due to our uncertainty.
3. Possibility
At one level of description, the first objection has a simple structure. There is a 
subjective reason to φ. That reason is either a complex proposition (Probability), 
or a proposition embedded within it (Prejacent). But both of these options raise 
serious problems for current forms of objectivism. The most interesting part of 
this objection is the explanation for why, on current forms of objectivism, that 
complex proposition (Probability) cannot be a subjective reason to φ. 
22 Sylvan, “What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be.”
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At that level of description, the structure of the second objection is the same. 
So is the problem raised by the complex proposition. The most interesting, and 
distinct, part of this objection will be the explanation for why, on current forms 
of objectivism, the relevant embedded proposition cannot be a subjective reason. 
That is a fairly abstract preamble. So let us jump into some cases. Consider 
Duquan. He is taking an exam that he must pass, but that requires him to answer 
every question correctly. And he wants to pass at all costs. He is stuck on one 
question: “Name one true philosophical theory.” Duquan skipped his philos-
ophy seminars, but his reliable friend told him that modal realism is true. So 
he answers, “Modal realism: all possible worlds are real.” Unfortunately, modal 
realism is false. Indeed, it is necessarily false. So he fails the exam. 
A slight variation on this case will ultimately be more revealing. Consider 
Emiliano. He is in the same position as Duquan, except that (a) his reliable 
friend said that error theory is true, and (b) Emiliano is one of those wonderful 
students who cares most about getting things right—he wants to assert truths, 
and to pass by offering correct answers. So Emiliano answers, “Error theory: 
there are no objective reasons.” Error theory is necessarily false. So he fails, too.
Let us introduce two data points that are quite intuitive, albeit challengeable:
Datum3: There was a subjective reason for Duquan/Emiliano to answer 
“modal realism”/“error theory” in the exam.
Datum4: There was no objective reason for Duquan/Emiliano to answer 
“modal realism”/“error theory” in the exam. 
For now, let us take these data points as given and ask whether they can be ac-
commodated by C. What was the relevant subjective reason? As in section 2, 
the best candidates are a complex proposition (in this case, the testimony) and 
a proposition embedded within it (in this case, the content of that testimony):
Testimony: The reliable friend said that modal realism/error theory is true.
Content: Modal realism is true/error theory is true.
I am agnostic about which proposition is the better candidate for the relevant 
subjective reason. But that does not matter, as both generate problems. 
Let us start with Testimony, as the problem here will be familiar. In fact, it 
will have exactly the same structure as the problem with Possibility, above. After 
all, Testimony is true. If Testimony is both true and a subjective reason to φ, then 
according to C it must be an objective reason to φ in the actual world. This is 
counterintuitive. It makes Datum3 true only if Datum4 is false. 
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These intuitions about negative existential claims can be challenged. But 
Schroeder’s test applies the same way to this case as it did to Carla’s case above. 
Intuitively, Testimony does not seem to be an objective reason for Duquan and 
Emiliano to answer “modal realism”/“error theory” and thereby fail the exam, 
even if we cancel the implicature that it is a weighty objective reason. And as 
before, this claim can be bolstered by noting that Testimony does not seem to 
play the roles that objective reasons for such actions play: it does not bear on 
whether Duquan and Emiliano did what they objectively ought to do, or bear 
on what informed bystanders ought to advise them to do. If Duquan whispered 
to an all-knowing invigilator, “Should I answer ‘modal realism’?” the fact that 
modal realism is false would clearly be relevant to whether he should answer no, 
but the fact that Testimony is true would clearly be irrelevant. Testimony is not 
merely outweighed by objective reasons (such as the fact that modal realism is 
false, which is a decisive objective reason not to answer “modal realism”); rather, 
Testimony fails to even compete with objective reasons at all. 
Still, some may doubt that Testimony fails to compete with the objective rea-
sons to answer “modal realism”/“error theory.” And, indeed, they might doubt 
the similar verdicts about Probability, Evidence, and Belief in section 2. Without 
relying on contentious claims about the nature of objective and subjective rea-
sons, what more can be said to bolster the claim that these facts do not play the 
right roles to be objective reasons for Carla, Duquan, and Emiliano to act? 
One way to bolster these verdicts is to carefully distinguish the negative 
existential claims in question from nearby claims that are either irrelevant or 
implausible. The relevant negative existential claim is that Testimony is not an 
objective reason for Emiliano to answer “error theory” (and mutatis mutandis 
for Duquan). This should be distinguished from other plausible but irrelevant 
negative existential claims in the vicinity, such as the claim that it is not the case 
that Emiliano objectively ought to answer “error theory” (and mutatis mutandis 
for Duquan). These verdicts at the all-things-considered or summative level are 
not what is at stake here. The relevant negative existential claim is that Testimony 
has no bearing on whether Emiliano objectively ought to answer “error theory” 
(and mutatis mutandis for Duquan). These verdicts about the contributory level 
are relevant, and are also plausible. Moreover, I am not making the implausible 
claim that facts about testimony can never be objective reasons for anything; I 
am making the claim that Testimony is not an objective reason to answer “modal 
realism”/“error theory.” Nor am I making the claim that in no sense is Testimo-
ny a reason to answer “modal realism”/“error theory.” After all, Testimony does 
bear on whether Duquan and Emiliano did what they subjectively ought to do, 
and on whether fully informed interlocutors should (a) recognize this, and/or 
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(b) criticize them for failing the exam. So Testimony is plausibly a subjective rea-
son for these students to perform these actions. It just is not plausibly a (coun-
terfactual) objective reason for them to do so.23
Some may still doubt these verdicts about Testimony et al., so I discuss this 
more in section 4. For now, let us put such doubts aside and consider the second 
(and perhaps more interesting and distinct) part of this objection to objectivism. 
This is the explanation for why, on current forms of objectivism, the relevant 
embedded proposition—Content—cannot be a subjective reason for Duquan 
and Emiliano to answer as they did. As I said before, I am not sure whether this 
proposition is the better candidate for the relevant subjective reason. I just think 
that there should be a good candidate (in order to explain Datum3), and if we 
have ruled out true, complex propositions like Testimony, the natural remaining 
candidates will be false, simple propositions like Content. 
Recall that, for C, Content is a subjective reason for Duquan and Emiliano 
to answer as they did only if the following holds: if Content were true, it would 
be an objective reason for Duquan to write “modal realism”/Emiliano to write 
“error theory.” However, Content cannot be true. So the relevant counterfactual 
will have a necessarily false antecedent. This poses two problems for C. The first 
is not devastating, but it is a good way to warm up to the second. 
The first problem is fairly obvious and immediate.24 Say we accept any theory 
that holds that a counterfactual is vacuously true if its antecedent is necessarily 
false. For instance, say we take a counterfactual to be true iff its consequent is 
true in the nearest possible worlds in which its antecedent is true. If there are no 
possible worlds in which the antecedent is true, the counterfactual is vacuously 
true. So for C, Content is a subjective reason to do anything.25
I do not want to focus on this first problem as I do not think it is devastating. 
Many balk at the idea that counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents are 
vacuously true, and propose that we should fix this bug by considering what is 
true at the nearest possible or impossible worlds in which the antecedent is true.26 
This fix avoids getting the wrong results in Duquan’s case. 
But notice the implications that this fix has when we turn to Emiliano’s case. 
23 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pushing me to further clarify these matters.
24 The following point was Whiting’s main objection to C in “Keep Things in Perspective.”
25 To be clear, the problem here would not be that C does not get the right result that Content 
is a subjective reason for Duquan to answer as he did. The problem would be that we get 
every single wrong result. Content is a subjective reason for Duquan to do literally anything, 
because any counterfactual with Content as the antecedent is vacuously true.
26 For general discussion, see Nolan, “Impossible Worlds.”
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This is where we get to the second problem, which I do think is devastating.27 In 
the impossible world in which error theory is true, there are no objective reasons 
whatsoever. In that impossible world, there is no objective reason for Emiliano 
to answer “error theory,” or indeed do anything at all, ever. So we have a subjec-
tive reason that could not be an objective reason in any possible or impossible 
world. What could be worse for C than the result that some subjective reasons 
for action are not (im)possible objective reasons for action? 
What can objectivists say in response? Some might claim that the objection 
relies on a false dilemma. Perhaps we should identify subjective reasons by ap-
pealing to the agent’s desires or goals.28 If this is so, then in some cases we will 
not need to appeal to Testimony or Content. Duquan, for instance, is a bit of a 
grade-grubber, so the subjective reason in his case might be as follows:
Pass: By answering “modal realism” I will pass the exam. 
I doubt that Pass poses problems for objectivists. But note that the correspond-
ing move is not available in Emiliano’s case because he is not a grade-grubber. 
Appealing to the content of his desires or goals leads us right back to Content. So 
far from being supported by the view that we should identify subjective reasons 
by appealing to the agent’s desires or goals, C is at odds with that picture when 
we consider students like Emiliano—or, indeed, professional philosophers who 
assert that error theory is true and only want to assert the truth. Indeed, C seems 
to be at odds with any view on which p can be our subjective reason to assert that 
p, which is a surprising and unwelcome result. 
Alternatively, some might respond that the objection above is devastating for 
C, but leaves other forms of objectivism unscathed. You might think that Whit-
ing’s view is especially well placed to address this objection, since it is largely 
motivated by appealing to problems concerning possibility and vacuity.29
Interestingly, however, Whiting’s view faces the same objection—or at least, 
an objection with the same structure. For Whiting, p is a subjective reason for 
A to φ iff and because p is an epistemically necessary objective reason for A to 
27 It might be said that this second problem has the form of the conditional fallacy (Shope, 
“The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy”), though that is not terribly infor-
mative given Shope’s “elaborate but somewhat obscure generic formulation of the condi-
tional fallacy” (Bonevac, Dever, and Sosa, “The Conditional Fallacy,” 275). If one is tempt-
ed by the thought that conditional fallacy-style counterexamples will obviously arise for a 
counterfactual analysis like C, it is worth reading on to note that the same problem under-
mines a prominent alternative to counterfactual analyses, namely Whiting’s view.
28 I am grateful to John Brunero for suggesting this.
29 See note 24, above. Whiting neglects the objections below in part because he focuses on 
counterfactuals involving necessary falsehoods where the truth is knowable a posteriori. 
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φ. More perspicuously: p is a subjective reason for A to φ iff and because it is a 
priori that, if the facts of the situation are as they appear to A, p is an objective 
reason for A to φ. Can this view accommodate Datum3 and Datum4? 
Whiting cannot appeal to Testimony. We saw above that it does not play the 
right roles to be an objective reason to answer “modal realism”/“error theory.” 
On that same basis, we can say that it is not a priori that if Testimony is true—
which it is, and which it appears to be for Duquan and Emiliano—it is an objec-
tive reason to answer “modal realism”/“error theory.” 
More interestingly, Whiting cannot take Content to be a subjective reason for 
Duquan and Emiliano to act. Both cases pose difficulties. In Duquan’s case, there 
are technical issues about how to handle necessary truths that are knowable a 
priori. It is knowable a priori that modal realism is false. On some views, that 
means that it is epistemically necessary that Content is false, and so epistemically 
necessary that Content is not an objective reason to do anything. 
The more interesting problem is posed by Emiliano’s case. Even if it is not 
epistemically necessary that error theory is false, it is clearly a priori that if things 
are as they appear to Emiliano—if Content is true—there is no objective reason 
for him to answer “error theory,” or indeed do anything. So for intuitive, non-
technical reasons, Content cannot be Emiliano’s reason to answer “error theory.” 
And, more generally, the content of what one asserts cannot be even part of a 
subjective reason for one to assert that error theory is true.
4. Outweighed Reasons
In section 2 I argued that complex propositions like Probability, Evidence, and 
Belief are not objective reasons for Carla to take the pill. Similarly, in section 3 
I argued that the complex proposition Testimony is not an objective reason for 
Duquan and Emiliano to answer as they did. These verdicts generate problems 
for current forms of objectivism, as it makes it tough for current objectivist 
views to explain how these propositions could be subjective reasons for Carla to 
take the pill or Duquan and Emiliano to answer as they did. I offered one way to 
bolster these verdicts by carefully distinguishing them from nearby claims that 
are either irrelevant or implausible. But given their central role in the objections 
to current forms of objectivism, more needs to be said to assuage any lingering 
doubts about these verdicts. In this section I attempt to remedy that. 
I suspect that lingering doubts about these verdicts are most likely to turn on 
a difficulty discussed above—namely, the difficulty of eliciting clear and proba-
tive intuitions about whether p is (a) a massively outweighed objective reason 
for A to φ, or (b) not an objective reason for A to φ. What more can be said to 
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bolster my verdicts that in the relevant cases p is not an (outweighed) objective 
reason? 
Here is a way to bolster these verdicts. Do not compare p to paradigm cases 
of strong or decisive objective reasons for A to φ. Instead, compare p to paradigm 
cases of massively outweighed objective reasons for A to φ. If this elicits clear 
and probative intuitions that p does not play the same roles as paradigm cases 
of massively outweighed objective reasons, that strongly suggests that p is not a 
massively outweighed objective reason after all. This will be my strategy. 
I want to execute this strategy using relatively simple cases and ecumenical 
resources. So let us return to Anna’s case, in which the fact that the red pill will 
cure her is a decisive objective reason for Anna to take the pill. Holding this fixed, 
we can elicit helpful intuitive data by comparing two versions of this case:
Mild Nausea: The red pill will also make Anna mildly nauseous.
Misleading Evidence: Anna receives evidence that the red pill will make 
her mildly nauseous, but this evidence is misleading—it will do no such 
thing.
In the first version of the case, I take it that the fact that the red pill will make 
Anna mildly nauseous is a paradigm instance of a massively outweighed objec-
tive reason for her not to take the red pill. My intuitions about this case seem 
clear and probative: this fact is relevant to what she objectively ought to do and 
what a fully informed interlocutor should advise her to do. Now compare this 
to Misleading Evidence. The fact that she receives misleading evidence does not 
play the same roles as our paradigmatic massively outweighed objective reason: 
it bears on what she subjectively ought to do, but it does not bear on what she 
objectively ought to do, nor does it bear on whether or not a fully informed inter-
locutor should advise her to take the red pill.
Since this comparison is between two putative massively outweighed objec-
tive reasons, it is hard to see how issues regarding weight could lead us astray 
here. And, if one wished to contend otherwise, they would face an uphill battle. 
If there is an objective reason not to take the red pill in Misleading Evidence, pre-
sumably we could increase its weight by increasing the strength of the evidence 
or the intensity of the nausea: such changes do not seem to make this misleading 
evidence relevant in the way that actual nausea would be relevant. Strong mis-
leading evidence of excruciating nausea still does not seem to bear on what Anna 
objectively ought to do, or on what a fully informed interlocutor should advise 
her to do, whereas mild actual nausea does bear on such matters.
If objectivists accept this judgment about misleading evidence in Anna’s case, 
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surely they should accept similar judgments about misleading evidence—like 
Testimony and Evidence—in cases like Carla’s, Duquan’s, and Emiliano’s.30 Ob-
jectivists should want to preserve a distinction between actual countervailing 
considerations and misleading evidence of countervailing considerations. This 
suggests that objectivists cannot easily answer the two central objections above 
by insisting that Testimony et al. are objective reasons for Carla et al. to act.
5. Conclusion and Diagnosis
Why do objectivists face these two objections? As was foreshadowed above, my 
diagnosis concerns an additional commitment that objectivists have taken on 
without argument: that we must analyze all subjective reasons directly. What 
does that mean? It means that we must analyze subjective reasons for A to φ in 
terms of corresponding objective reasons for that agent to perform that same 
action. For instance, according to the objectivist views we have considered, p is 
a subjective reason for Carla to take the pill only if p is counterfactually an ob-
jective reason for Carla to take the pill (counterfactual analyses); Carla is com-
petently attracted to treating p like an objective reason to take the pill (Sylvan’s 
view); or p is an epistemically necessary objective reason for Carla to take the 
pill (Whiting’s view). By taking on this commitment, objectivists have occupied 
a fairly narrow region of logical space. And the two objections above reveal that 
it is also a fairly unappealing region of logical space.
Consider the first objection. We saw that Probability is the most plausible 
candidate for a subjective reason for Carla to take the pill. The problem was not 
that it cannot be an objective reason per se. It was that Probability does not play 
the right roles to be a counterfactual (and hence actual) objective reason for 
Carla to take the pill, and Carla cannot competently treat it as an objective rea-
son to take the pill. This problem is compounded because on these objectivist 
views no other proposition is a good candidate for being the subjective reason 
for Carla to take the pill, so objectivists struggle to explain intuitive data points.
Now consider the second objection. We saw that Testimony is a plausible can-
didate for a subjective reason for Emiliano to answer “error theory.” Again, the 
problem is not that this proposition cannot be an objective reason per se. It is 
that this proposition is not a plausible candidate for a counterfactual or epis-
30 It is worth noting here that Julia Markovits has defended a similar view: “If expert testimony 
gives us most reason to believe some act would be best then that testimony is the reason we 
ought to perform that act,” even if that testimony is misleading; but as she argues, these 
“moral reasons for us to perform some action are subjective” and not objective reasons (Mar-
kovits, “Saints, Heroes, Sages, and Villains,” 306–7).
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temically necessary objective reason for Emiliano to answer “error theory.” This 
problem is compounded because objectivists cannot take the false content of 
that testimony to be a subjective reason for Emiliano to answer as he did, so 
once again objectivists struggle to accommodate intuitive data points.
This does not show that we cannot analyze subjective reasons in terms of 
objective reasons. It suggests that we cannot analyze all subjective reasons for A 
to φ directly, in terms of objective reasons for A to φ. So the problem is not that 
objectivism is false, but that it has been construed narrowly, and naïvely.
Interestingly, this diagnosis dovetails nicely with a lesson Frank Jackson drew 
a long time ago about the relation between objective and subjective normative 
notions. Jackson noticed that, in some cases involving uncertainty, we subjec-
tively ought to φ even though we know that it is definitely not the case that we 
objectively ought to φ. Jackson took this to show that naïve views that derived 
subjective oughts directly from objective oughts were problematic; instead, we 
should adopt a “decision-theoretic” view about the subjective ought.31
Some details of Jackson’s own view are not compatible with objectivism. But 
they do not concern us. The interesting point is that objectivists could offer a 
decision-theoretic explanation of the subjective reasons for Carla and Emiliano 
to φ in terms of objective reasons for credences and preferences.
That explanation would require many moving parts that warrant indepen-
dent motivation and extensive discussion. I will not delve into those details here. 
All that I hoped to do here is motivate the exploration of neglected areas of log-
ical space: objectivists can and should seek to analyze some subjective reasons 
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